Articole

Young People’s Perceptions of Compensation Gaps and Board Independence in Listed European Banks: An Empirical Study

MK
Matei Anghel Lucian Claudiu Kacso-Carstocea ✉
Faculty of Management, SNSPA
2026 / Nr. 4 pp. 590–599 Engleză DOI: 10.65631/jes.4.2026.53
Constantin Brâncuși University of Târgu Jiu Economics Series · 2026
Corporate governance has become increasingly important in the banking sector, where transparency, accountability, and stakeholder trust are essential for long-term sustainability. This study examines young people's perceptions of executive compensation gaps and board independence in listed European banks and explores how these factors are associated with perceptions of good corporate governance. Data were collected through an online questionnaire administered to 65 respondents, and the relationships among the variables were examined using descriptive statistics and multiple linear regression analysis. The findings indicate that perceptions of executive compensation gaps are significantly associated with perceptions of good corporate governance, whereas board independence demonstrates a positive but statistically non-significant association. Together, the two explanatory variables account for approximately 25.7% of the variation in governance perceptions. The study contributes to the corporate governance literature by providing evidence on stakeholder perceptions of compensation practices and board independence among young people, a group that represents future employees, investors, and decision-makers. The findings highlight the importance of perceived fairness and transparency in shaping evaluations of corporate governance within the European banking sector.
corporate governance executive compensation board independence stakeholder perceptions European banks.
Publicat
31.08.2026
MK
Matei Anghel Lucian Claudiu Kacso-Carstocea Corespondent
Faculty of Management, SNSPA
Matei Anghel Lucian Claudiu Kacso-Carstocea (2026). Young People’s Perceptions of Compensation Gaps and Board Independence in Listed European Banks: An Empirical Study. Constantin Brâncuși University of Târgu Jiu Economics Series, 2(1), 590–599. https://doi.org/10.65631/jes.4.2026.53
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